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1.  Introduction
In Cesar Chavez and the Common Sense of Nonviolence, 
José-Antonio Orosco seeks to incorporate Cesar Chavez into 
mainstream social and political thought. Given Chavez’s life and 
work, this goal necessitates a subsequent blurring of the line 
between political theory and activity, an act which seats Chavez 
alongside of many Latin American thinkers in the wake of 
Comtean positivism. Placing the Mexican-American farmworker 
into the tradition of nonviolent political protest, Orosco presents 
Chavez as an iconoclastic thinker, i.e., an individual who works 
and lives according to ideals that try to change society for the 
better. In this sense, Chavez is a community intellectual who 
articulated, refined, and embodied these ideals in the first 
place (5-6).
This review will first sketch the terrain of Orosco’s account 
of the major moments in Chavez’s life and thought. Doing more 
than providing an overview of the union leader’s speeches and 
letters, Orosco challenges the reader to rethink the complexities 
behind Chavez’s actions by presenting his criticism of a variety 
of intellectuals and social ideas: e.g., Churchill’s criticism of 
nonviolent protest; Fanon and Guevara’s calls for revolutionary 
struggle and practice; the idea of property damage as civil unrest 
or disobedience; as well as the institutional and social patterns 
endorsing a culture of exclusion, oppression, and violence. 
According to Orosco, Chavez’s great politico-philosophical 
contribution (and also the motivating force behind his social 
action) was a profound and nuanced understanding of 
nonviolence, “the common sense of nonviolence” (3).
Second, this review will question the recurrent theme 
of sacrifice, penitence, and self-knowledge apparent in 
Chavez’s theory of nonviolence. My aim here is to question the 
performative and sometimes gruesome aspects of Chavez’s 
actions, in addition to rethinking the consequences and moral 
implications of his type of nonviolent protest. With the explicit 
goal of making visible pain and suffering, does the kind of 
sacrifice associated with something like fasting constitute or 
depend upon a type of violence, albeit a violence to the self? 
Chavez’s reason for hunger strikes and long marches was the 
desire to engender a level of discomfort allowing for further 
understanding of the pain and suffering felt by the victims 
of exploitation.1 Does this not maintain that suffering is a 
necessary condition for human consciousness (on a critical 
reflective level)? On this point Chavez’s stance is similar to 
that of G.W.F. Hegel and Sigmund Freud. However, as Orosco 
points out, Chavez’s understanding of suffering is connected to 
Mexican understandings of penitence, hence “the masochism 
of Mexicanidad.” And though the questions I have can be 
directed towards nonviolent theory in general, they force one 
to consider Chavez as more than just a political activist or union 
organizer. They present the reader with Cesar Chavez, Latino 
philosopher.
2. A Cultural “Revolution”
The political philosophy of such figures as Thomas Hobbes 
assumes a philosophical anthropology founded on axioms 
undergirding much Western political thought: humans as 
violent, competitive, self-interested beings subject to a scarcity 
of goods and in need of governance.2 Although a philosophy 
of non-violence and any political action based on this theory 
challenges this view, the difficulties that arise from the attempt 
to make peaceful social organization the basis for human 
life seemingly prove the Hobbesian humanism. Cautiously 
avoiding the traps of identity politics and banking on the 
“commonsensical” aspects of Chavez’s thought, Orosco argues 
that the nonviolent life requires an understanding of human 
social organization that does not rest upon political power as the 
exercise of domination, but a commitment to justice understood 
as the alleviation of oppression through self-sacrifice.
From the onset of his book Orosco is keen to point out that 
there is an unprecedented concern (or even fear) of the growing 
Latino/a population in the United States. He stresses that many 
advertisers, politicians, and cultural critics are beginning to 
focus attention on this emerging population (1). And though 
such a large group of people is no more united than the rest 
of the country, some hold that there is reason to believe that 
a growing fractious collective is on the rise.3 These suspicions 
are part of a cultural attitude that requires negativity, exclusion, 
and polarization. The thought can be expressed through the 
following sentiment: “We are Americans, our values represent 
the core American way of life…they are not of our way of life 
therefore they are not American.” For Chavez, this attitude was 
apparent in treatment of Mexican farmworkers as a transitory 
labor force undeserving of respect. Moreover, the subsequent 
dehumanization of these people allowed for the establishment 
of a sub-working-class who can be dealt with in any manner 
necessary—personal and institutionalized forms of violence 
(e.g., institutional racism) often being the most apt.4
Chavez’s encounters with nativist social prejudice and 
the endemic racism of the mid-twentieth century inspired his 
awareness of the need for social justice (19). Anticipating the 
political power that an emerging Hispanic population would 
hold, Chavez saw oppressive social structures and racist 
practices as an attempt to delay this power. Fittingly, one of 
the main goals of Orosco’s text is to show how Chavez and La 
Causa represent a collective effort to unify farmworkers through 
a sense of historical agency. This is social organization through 
a self-determination that looks past the immediate goals or 
setbacks of a movement while considering future injustices 
(6). This unification ensures the type of empowerment that 
combats the oppressive conditions under which many workers 
lived, in addition to providing a network that would challenge 
the racist attitudes of white America.
Although figures like Huntington, Hanson, and even Chavez 
himself see this self-determination as the awakening of a 
sleeping Hispanic power-block, Orosco argues that Latino/as 
do not represent a unanimous, ominous collective but a 
heterogeneous group seeking inclusion into the American 
dream (21-22). However, if Chavez is banking on the idea that 
people in similar positions of oppression share analogous 
demands for justice, then there is room for argument with 
Orosco about the last point. Nonetheless, there is no doubt 
that Chavez attempted to provide Latino/as with a sense of 
civic responsibility and democratic participation while striving 
to engender a culture of peace inside of the United States. 
His direct goal was not to change the policies of U.S. society, 
although changes were required insofar as the system itself 
is prejudicial. More important was the transformation of the 
culture that supports and provides the values of this country, 
since Chavez is of the opinion that these values are misplaced 
or wrong (this being the subversive or revolutionary aspect of La 
Causa) (44). Following this line of thought, it is safe to argue that 
Chavez understood the formal policies of a nation as responding 
to the culture that supports or warrants its necessity.
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Given that his goal was to change the culture of U.S. society, 
which in consequence would reformulate the nation, his 
objective could be called “trans-national.”5 This trans-national 
approach is the basis for Orosco’s criticism of Churchill’s 
critique of nonviolent political protest and the narrow traps of 
identity politics found in some Chicano politics. For example, 
Orosco shows how Churchill thinks nonviolent political theory 
mistakenly assumes the moral high ground when choosing 
not to engage in revolutionary military combat, as if moral 
superiority is enough to persuade a state to stop its oppressive 
tactics (35). Presenting what amounts to Chavez’s critique 
of this line of reasoning, Orosco writes that there are three 
conceptual mistakes which support the pro-violence view: 
(1) the understanding of political authority as ultimately the 
exercise of violence (the myth of violence), (2) the lack of vision 
into the real potency of moral criticism, and (3) the inability 
to recognize that the immediate goal of nonviolent theory 
is not the overturning the state (37-44). Focusing on the last, 
Orosco writes, “Chavez speaks of developing power not for the 
immediate purpose of overthrowing the state but for creating 
alternatives to mainstream political and economic institutions 
that will be the focal points for engaging people in activities 
to learn democratic skills and abilities for self-determination” 
(44).
Along the same lines, Chavez’s criticism of the type of 
identity politics found in narrow Chicano nationalism pushes 
a “trans-national” agenda. Stopping racist behavior and 
formulating an authentic sense of self is crucial for Hispanic, 
Latino/as, Chicano/as, etc. However, the positing of an identity 
construed in strict oppositional terms—situations where, as 
Orosco writes, “Chicano/a identity derives its content primarily 
by defining itself against, or by rejecting, white mainstream 
culture” (81)—does nothing to combat the underlying structures 
and causes of oppression. Moreover, as I tried to convey above, 
it revels in the same pattern of thought that motivates nativist 
ideology. This is not to say that all Chicano nationalism lacks 
a structural component nor is this a homogenous movement. 
But, as the author writes, “[m]erely challenging mainstream 
America’s racism, as narrow ethnic nationalism did, might 
diminish the resources of cultural violence that lend support 
to structural violence; but that strategy would not, by itself, 
dismantle the institutions of power that marginalize and 
discriminate against people of color” (85).
Likewise, as the chapter on “structural violence” or 
institutional prejudice shows, focusing solely on policy changes 
or specific public practices does not venture far enough 
to dispel the cultural prejudices that spark racist (and thus 
violent) institutions and ways of life (72). Building on the work 
of Johan Galtung and Jürgen Habermas, Orosco argues that 
“cultural violence,” oppressive behavior that results in what 
can be called structural or institutional violent acts (i.e., the 
necessary assimilation of one group into another for reasons 
based upon the fear of becoming a bilingual or multicultural 
society), can still occur in settings where little or no personal 
violence is taking place.
In this manner the progressive element of La Causa 
becomes obvious, especially when Orosco uses Chavez’s 
words to convey the idea that the movement “doesn’t have to 
be experienced twice” (22). Put differently, the farmworkers’ 
struggle, which in this sense is more than just a movement for 
farmworkers, does not begin from scratch with every generation. 
Building upon past achievements, a culture of peace requires 
a rethinking of “time” (a point which I will return to later) and 
continual dialogue towards a more just society (23). Placing 
Latino/as and migrant workers of a variety of backgrounds 
into the American imaginary as affective contributors to this 
conversation, this progressive minded dialogue synthesizes the 
oppositional points of view that sometimes appear intransigently 
locked in the bitter confines of identity politics, another point 
that supports Chavez’s reasoning for the de-centering of race 
as the basis for La Causa (85).
Though there remains some tension in Orosco’s portrayal 
of Chavez as a reformist who sought to create social change 
by changing the values that are said to historically define the 
“American” mentality (i.e., assimilative, pro Anglo-Protestant 
hegemonic beliefs), a culture of peace does not come as a result 
of cultural imposition or aggressive take over. The supporters 
of La Causa are not attempting to override American culture 
by overt aggressive tactics or overwhelming numbers. On 
the contrary, Chavez’s culture of peace begins in the relaying 
of social injustices, an act that requires not only affective 
communication but also personal encounters with suffering. 
Undergirded by a humanism differing from that espoused in 
traditional pre-political violent social relations, the encounter 
with suffering is not self-alienating or exclusive, but receptive 
towards foreigners and the difference they bring.
3. The Masochism of Mexicanidad
For Chavez, the liberation of the oppressed members of a society 
should serve as the impetus of self-realization. The most famous 
line that expresses this idea is often quoted,
When we are really honest with ourselves we must 
admit that our lives are all that really belong to us. So 
it is how we use our lives that determines what kind 
of men we are. It is my deepest belief that only by 
giving our lives do we find life. I am convinced that the 
truest act of courage, the strongest act of manliness is 
to sacrifice ourselves for others in a totally nonviolent 
struggle for justice. To be a man is to suffer for others. 
God help us to be men.” (91)
Also the basis for a new masculinity, since Chavez thinks 
that too many young men are influenced by a commercially 
driven culture that promotes the exercise of power as an act of 
domination,6 the idea of self-sacrifice is a form of self-realization 
grounded in the liberation of the other. This humanism requires 
a willingness to combat social injustice and share in the 
suffering of the oppressed members of society. However, to 
sacrifice oneself to those in need requires familiarity with what 
the other is going through: commiseration.
At the heart of Chavez’s many marches and long fast 
was the hope that intentional suffering would inspire a sense 
of reflection that allows one to understand unjustified pain. 
For Orosco, this type of asceticism is grounded in Mexican 
culture and folk-wisdom (24). This being “the Masochism of 
Mexicanidad,” a fixation with suffering often seen in Mexican 
religious practice and worship,7 there is a performative 
and ritualistic aspect to these public expressions of sorrow. 
Reverence for Christ and the Passion are also present in 
penitential suffering.
For those exploited like the farmworkers, those who 
labor but only receive inadequate monetary compensation, 
their marches and days without food are meant to provide 
a cleansing that allows for insights into one’s condition: self-
knowledge (25-29). In this setting a culture of peace provides 
the type of reflection that not only generates a profound 
demand for justice but also challenges the idea that through 
war self-reflection becomes possible. As Orosco points out, 
the self-awareness often credited to moments of war are not 
as helpful in the realization of self-consciousness as one might 
think. This is the basis for the criticism of Fanon and Guevara 
available in the text, considering that these revolutionaries 
prescribe to an idea that self-determination includes the violent 
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overthrow of unjust political situations; the self-numbing that 
allows for the dehumanization of the enemy limits any possible 
experience of the self since it requires a removal or quieting of 
moral sense (47-48).
It is through suffering, then, that the exploited gain 
themselves back, self-recognition. However, Chavez’s theory of 
the self as connected to suffering relates to two ideas from the 
history of philosophy: (1) the way in which angst and toil furthers 
the progression of self-consciousness in Hegel’s master/slave 
dialectic, and (2) the development of the self in conjunction 
with an awareness of suffering in Freud’s later work. My concern 
here is that Chavez’s pattern of thinking shares an understanding 
of human consciousness (on a critically reflective level) often 
espoused in relations of oppression, alienation, and sometimes 
violence.
For Hegel, especially in the Phenomenology of Spirit, where 
he tries to provide an account of how objective knowledge 
of the world is possible, the move from sense-certainty to 
self-consciousness requires the realization that one does not 
live in a solipsistic world but a place inhabited by other (self-) 
consciousnesses. Initially these others serve as objects through 
which self-realization is possible.8 When this realization occurs 
a social pattern tends to develop, it rests upon the necessity of 
abolishing the alien aspects of others in order to discover the 
self in them—an act that denies their alterity (Hegel, p. 167). This 
is Hegel’s master/slave dialectic, a life-and-death struggle that 
thrives on the tension generated by opposition. Here, the progress 
of Spirit’s self-consciousness requires domination. However, as 
it is well known, an inversion takes place and the slave ends up 
being the one with the real sense of self, i.e., the real ability to 
arrive at self-discovery (Hegel, p. 193). The means through which 
this is done are the toils of labor; the ability to endure work and 
suffer hardships as a slave brings the type of recognition furthering 
self-consciousness. The slave finds himself/herself in the world 
through labor—a type of suffering.
Likewise, in Civilization and Its Discontents, while providing 
a pathology of the inclusive or “oceanic” feeling endorsed by 
representatives of religious traditions, Freud argues that the 
initial detachment or formulation of the ego arises out of our 
first instances of pain and suffering.9 The realization of the split 
or partition between one’s self and the world around them (our 
alienation from the world around us) is caused by the desire to 
appease the various means through which displeasure arises. 
In this scenario our sense of self is not possible without the 
frustration that arises from realization that the world does not 
automatically respond to our needs. Our needs only become 
apparent through suffering. Maturing and becoming a full 
member of society implies the proper sublimation of desires 
via the constrictions of social relations, e.g., the reality principle. 
However, this process requires the type of self-examination that 
necessitates suffering in the first place.
When Orosco writes, “Besides evoking the cultural 
symbolism of the procession, Chavez intended the Sacramento 
March to be a time for the farmworkers and other marchers to 
model the penitent and suffer from fatigue, heat, and thirst in 
order to induce self-reflection,” (27) does he not place Chavez 
in line with the previous thinkers? To argue that people need to 
feel pain in order to self-reflect or gain the type of awareness 
that awakens one’s moral sensibilities is to think that moral 
reasoning is impossible without suffering. In addition, if taken to 
their extreme, do the possible outcomes of a hunger strike (i.e., 
starvation) amount to self-inflicted violence? If starvation is not 
the goal, but the goal is to force a moral circumstance, what is 
it that makes this situation moral? It is the fact that someone’s 
well-being is at stake. Chavez’s actions personify this fact; the 
actions of the growers are killing, harming, or hindering people, 
and Chavez must go through his protest to make this visible. 
But again, does this not require the threat of death, even if it is 
self-inflicted? To say that peace requires sacrifice, and that this 
sacrifice is violent or harmful towards oneself, is to really say 
that peace requires violence, but not the type aimed towards 
others.
Thus, Chavez’s long marches and fast are performative acts 
requiring the (possible) presence of death to highlight a moral 
situation. Using Chavez’s words, Orosco writes, “He believes 
that when people see these symbols of sacrifice they will be 
moved to help in some fashion. ‘When you sacrifice you force 
others to sacrifice. It’s a powerful weapon. When somebody 
stops eating for a week or ten days, people come and they want 
to be part of that experience’” (105; emphasis added). In no way 
do I seek to challenge the goals of La Causa. As a philosopher I 
am only interested in what philosophical or theoretical insights 
I can infer from Chavez’s actions. This is especially true in light 
of his views on moral reasoning.
Deliberation, communication, and peace being crucial to 
Chavez’s ideals, human social organization and the political 
structures that come to support it are drastically different 
in a framework where power is joint exercise of affective 
communication (25).  Individuals working together require the 
ability to live peacefully. Living peacefully is not that difficult 
when people work together to bring it about. Building on the 
work of Hannah Arendt, Orosco argues that rather than having 
“power over” (governance as domination), “power with” is the 
recognition of the shared goals of a community (93).
In this sense rather than argue that we live in uncertain 
yet critical times, i.e., moments of crises, Orosco holds Chavez 
to be quite sure of the goals he seeks to realize. Not being an 
advocate of crisis time, which uses the fear of social catastrophe 
as a motivator for social change, Chavez was quite confident 
that justice and truth would prevail (106). “Sooner or later,” he 
thought, “truth is going to be exposed. …Mankind has never been 
able to deal with the suppression of truth” (107). Though there 
are possible eschatological and certain teleological aspects to 
this train of thought, such that one can speculate whether or not 
a concern with a final judgment or day of reckoning is present, 
the message is quite clear: peace and social justice take time. 
In other words, peace requires patience, the literal definition 
of which is the quality of enduring suffering.
Endnotes
1. See Jose-Antonio Orosco 2008, 23-27.
2. Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan (Indiana: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1994), 74-78.
3. See Samuel Huntington’s Who Are We? The Challenges to 
American National Identity (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
2004), and Victor Davis Hanson’s Mexifornia: A State of 
Becoming (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2003), for 
more on this growing fear of immigration and national 
dissolution.
4. Orosco provides the following comment by a grower: “We 
protect our farmers here in Kern County. They are our best 
people. They are always with us. They keep the country 
going. …But the Mexicans are trash. They have no standard 
of living. We herd them like pigs” (Emphasis Added) (Orosco 
2008, 80).
5. Aware of the complexities that surround this term, I use 
‘trans-national’ in the sense that Chavez’s project exceeds or 
ventures beyond the goal of reconstituting the nation. Hence 
the prefix ‘trans.’ Perhaps a more appropriate term could be 
‘meta-national’ (in the fashion of meta-ethics or metaphysics), 
since it is safe to say that the cultural or social atmosphere of 
a people supply the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
the possibility (and need) of a country in the first place. But 
I am sure that this is another paper altogether.
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6. “Chavez wants a man to be someone who is willing to 
sacrifice himself and his well-being for the benefit of others, 
not by fighting or using physical strength but by taking the pain 
of others upon himself, feeling it, through nonviolent practice 
and discipline” (Orosco 2008, 91). For more see Orosco 2008, 
88-89.
7. For some, this masochism has its roots in Indigenous practices 
of Mesoamerica (Orosco 2008, 28).
8. G.W.F. Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). (See section “B” of 
“Self-Consciousness”; pp. 174-77 and the subsection titled 
“Lordship and Bondage” in particular.)
9. Sigmund Freud. Civilization and Its Discontents (New York: 
Norton & Company, 2005), 39-41.
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